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Long-term care (LTC) is the largest insurable risk that old-age individuals face in most 
western societies. However, the demand for LTC insurance is still ostensibly small in 
comparison to the financial risk. One explanation that has received limited support is that 
expectations of either ‘public sector funding’ and ‘family support’ crowd out individual 
incentives to seek insurance. This paper aims to investigate further the above mentioned 
motivational crowding out hypothesis by developing a theoretical model and by drawing 
on an innovative empirical analysis of representative European survey data containing 
records on individual expectations of LTC funding sources (including private insurance, 
social insurance and the family). The theoretical model predicts that, when informal care 
is treated as exogenously determined, expectations of both state support and informal care 
can potentially crowd out LTC insurance expectations, while this is not necessarily the 
case when informal care is endogenous to insurance, as happens when intra-family moral 
hazard is integrated in the insurance decision. Evidence from expectations data suggest 
evidence consistent with the presence of family crowding out, but no evidence of public 
sector crowding out, except for the cohort of individuals older than 55.   
 
Keywords: long-term care, old-age dependency, long-term care insurance, family crowding 
out, public sector crowding out.  
 








1. Introduction  
 
Long-term care (LTC) is perhaps one of the clearest examples of incomplete welfare 
insurance. Generally, it is observed that, individuals fail to purchase insurance when it is 
optimal to do so (Meier, 1999). Individuals in need of care, instead of purchasing insurance, 
appear to rely on public support or burdening their family members with caregiving duties, 
if and when available, or are left to self-insure when they can afford it
1
. The literature 
contains several explanations for the relatively low development of LTC insurance market. 
A number of theoretical arguments have been put forward, and various empirical studies 
have been developed largely focusing on the context of the United States (Pestieau and 
Ponthière, 2012), but limited evidence is gathered from elsewhere, in part due to the absence 
of a market and, hence, revealed evidence of purchase. However, as we argue in this paper, 
the limited market development does not mean that individuals do not expect the private 
insurance market to develop as either a more efficient alternative to self-insurance, or as a 
complement to public insurance.  
Amongst the frequent factors explaining the low development of LTC insurance are 
biased risk perceptions, limited knowledge and a myopic denial of the risk (Kunreuther, 
1978; Costa-Font and Font Vilalta, 2009). Other more conventional explanations include the 
existence of moral hazard (or over-consumption of insured care) and of adverse selection (or 
over-representation of bad risks in the insured population) as stressed by Brown and 
Finkelstein (2009). Finally, the role of the state of insurer of last resort and the incentives 
within the family structure (Pauly, 1990) has received limited attention. We concentrate in 
this paper on the latter two factors namely the motivational effects of the expected 
availability of public support and of informal care.  
Some scholars have put forward the hypothesis of a crowding-out effect of private LTC 
insurance by public LTC insurance. In a seminal article, Pauly (1990) argued that the non-
purchase of LTC insurance by the elderly might be a perfectly rational choice in the 
presence of a means-tested public insurance scheme. This is confirmed by evidence 
suggesting that demand for private LTC insurance is undermined by the availability of 
public support or social assistance. Sloan and Norton (1997) observed in the United States a 
negative correlation between Medicaid availability and the purchase of LTC insurance. 
Brown and Finkelstein (2004) found that, for two-thirds of the US elderly, it is rational not 
                                               
1
 This is in sharp contrast to the fact that LTC’s risk characteristic makes it a paradigmatic case for insurance, 
with 35 to 50 percent of the elderly population using LTC in their lifetime on average in European countries, 
while roughly one-sixth exhibit almost catastrophic expenses (European Commission, 2008). 
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to purchase LTC insurance because its benefits simply replace support from other sources. 
According to Brown and Finkelstein (2008), Medicaid’s large crowding-out effect arises 
because of the “implicit tax” that Medicaid imposes on the purchase of private policies 
(Brown et al., 2007). Specifically, a large part of the premium that individuals pay for the 
purchase of a private policy goes to pay for benefits that end up duplicating benefits that 
Medicaid would have paid for in the absence of a private policy. The latter assumes 
individual’s qualify for Medicaid.  
As LTC can be provided both formally and informally, the decision to purchase LTC 
insurance is also known to be influenced by intergenerational interactions and, in particular 
expectations of informal care. More specifically, intra-family moral hazard has been pointed 
out in the LTC insurance market and has long been considered a cause for the sluggish 
development of private LTC insurance (Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998). Intra-
family moral hazard refers to the disincentives for children as potential informal care givers 
to provide care when the parent has LTC insurance. Anticipating this, the parent abstains 
from buying LTC insurance
2
. However, empirical evidence on the purchase of LTC 
insurance appears to indicate some complementarity between insurance and informal care
3
. 
The latter could happen if altruistic parents purchase LTC insurance to avoid burdening 
potential informal caregivers (Courbage and Roudaut, 2008).  
The aim of this paper is to investigate how expectations of public support and informal 
care influence insurance expectations. Very few empirical studies focus on the decision to 
purchase LTC insurance in Europe, mainly because the market for LTC insurance has not 
kicked off in most European countries, except for France and more recently Germany. The 
purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. To that aim, we first develop a theoretical model 
where we consider an individual with a state-dependent utility function who decides the 
amount of LTC coverage purchased to protect against the financial cost of LTC needs. 
Theoretical predictions show that when informal care is exogenous, both state support and 
informal care crowds out LTC insurance. However, when informal care is endogenous to 
                                               
2
 The substitutability between LTC insurance and informal care has also given rise to the so-called “family 
crowding-out” hypothesis, which states that the availability of informal family arrangements hampers the 
development of private LTC insurance (Costa-Font, 2010). 
3
 In contrast to the notion that family members serve as substitutes for LTC insurance, Mellor (2001) showed for 
the United States that the availability of informal caregivers has no statistically significant effect on LTC 
insurance purchase. This was confirmed by Courbage and Roudaut (2008), who found for France that the 
probability of owning LTC insurance increases for those who have a higher probability of receiving informal 






insurance, as happens if the parent integrates intra-family moral hazard in his decision, then 
both more public support or the availability of informal care could increase the demand for 
LTC insurance. Second, the effects of state support and informal care availability on the 
decision to purchase insurance are empirically tested in an innovative way using individual 
European expectations data. Results suggest evidence of family crowding out but no 
evidence of public sector crowding out.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly present the ways LTC is 
financed in Europe with a special emphasize on private insurance. Section 3 introduces the 
theoretical model on the optimal demand for LTC insurance. In section 4, we test for the 
existence of both public and family insurance (motivational) crowding-out using data on 
individual expectations. Finally, the last section offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Background on LTC financing in Europe 
 
In most European countries, publicly financed LTC is highly fragmented and offer partial 
coverage, even when there is an entitlement to publicly funded care. Hence, individuals are 
expected to pay a large share of the cost of LTC. The latter coexists with other forms of 
support for the access to nursing home care based on ability to pay (such as Ireland), topped 
up by cash allowances (as in Italy or Poland). In France, as reported by Colombo et al. 
(2011), a locally run ‘Allocation Personalisée d’Autonomie’ is available to disabled people 
aged 60 or older living either at home or in a nursing home, covering personal care costs 
borne by dependents, but co-funded by beneficiaries and their families.  
LTC services have been integrated into social insurance in several countries, among them 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. With the exception of Belgium, it is separated from 
health insurance, however funding is through employment contributions that may include 
the elderly and may be subsidised by the government to an extent, resulting in differences in 
the extend of governments participation in the funding of LTC. Benefits are defined in terms 
of a fixed reimbursement of cost as in Germany or as a percentage of cost, causing benefits 
to automatically increase with cost. In the region of Flanders (Belgium), social LTC 
insurance pays out cash benefits (Colombo et al., 2011).  
Where insurance does not exist, government programs (local, regional or national) 
support individuals as a funder of last resort. In Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland), general taxation is used to fund universal comprehensive packages 
that include LTC services that are delivered locally or regionally as, e.g. in Denmark. A few 
other European countries are moving in this direction as well. For instance, Spain introduced 
a tax-funded scheme to be completed by 2015, with regional governments matching the 
 
     
 
 6 
national government to finance LTC services on a means-tested basis (Costa-Font and Font-
Vilalta, 2006). In Scotland, a tax-funded scheme guarantees free access to LTC subject to 
needs testing (in contrast to England).  
As for private LTC insurance, two types of products have developed, namely partial 
reimbursement policies and indemnity policies. However, in most European countries less 
than 2% of total LTC expenditure is financed through private LTC insurance (Colombo and 
Mercier, 2012). Generally, the scope for private insurance depends greatly on its 
interdependence with public insurance on one hand and throughout intergenerational norms 
on the other hand. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to achieve a substantial market share without a 
degree of subsidization targeted at lower-income groups.  
France is the largest LTC insurance market in Europe, with about 5.5 million 
policyholders in 2010. Individual policies account for 45% and group policies for 55% of 
the market, which is highly concentrated, with five companies having 70% market share 
(FFSA-GEMA, 2010). Products are mainly indemnity cash benefits, which generally do not 
cover full cost, thus imposing a degree of cost sharing.  
Germany is the second largest European private market insurance, comprising mandatory 
private LTC insurance, and private supplementary LTC insurance. Nearly 1.3 million 
German people were covered by supplementary LTC insurance in 2008 (GDV, 2009), which 
is sold as a supplement (or top-ups) to the benefit of the compulsory LTC insurance scheme. 
In other European countries, the private LTC insurance markets remain very small, with 
different trends. It is growing in countries such as Spain and Italy, but stagnating elsewhere 
such as in the U.K. and the Nordic countries (SCOR, 2012). 
 
3. A theoretical model on optimal LTC insurance demand 
 
3.1 The basic model 
 
We consider a parent characterized by a state-dependent vNM utility function defined over 
wealth and conditioned on being dependent (𝑢(. )) or not (𝑣(. )) with 𝑢(. ) < 𝑣(. ) for the 
same level of wealth. Let p be the probability of being dependent and needing LTC. In case 
of dependency, the parent can purchase formal LTC. Let N be the cost of LTC in case of 
dependency. The parent can also expect to receive informal care, e, from his child. Informal 
care has the benefit of reducing the cost of LTC at a decreasing rate
4
. Hence N depends on 
the level of informal LTC e provided by the child and N(e) is such that 𝑁′(𝑒) < 0 and 
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 We implicitly assume that elderly parents in need of assistance would first turn to informal care services and 






𝑁′′(𝑒) < 0. It means that we assume informal LTC and formal LTC to be substitutes5, i.e. 
more informal care leads to less formal care. We also assume that individuals expect to 
receive public support in case of LTC needs. Let s be the means-tested level of public 
support, which is a decreasing and concave function of initial wealth 𝑤0. The level of public 
support is then defined by the function 𝑠(𝑤0, 𝛼) where 𝛼 represents an exogenous parameter 
to reflect any change in the level of public support. 
We also consider that the parent is altruistic in the sense that he can be sensitive to the 
negative impact of providing care on the informal caregiver’s quality of life, both in terms of 
his health and income, as stressed in van den Berg et al. (2005). To address parental 
altruism, we assume that the parent negatively values the offer of informal care from his 
child. We then make the utility function in case of dependency dependent on the level of 








< 0 where the 
subscript e means that we differentiate with respect to the second argument i.e. e, and the 
subscript w means that we differentiate with respect to wealth, i.e. the first argument.
6
 
Therefore we assume that the more informal care is provided the lower both the utility of 
wealth and the marginal utility of wealth to reflect parental altruism. The individual can also 
purchase a LTC insurance policy which offers an indemnity I in case of dependency. The 
insurance contract is supposed to be in the form of a cash-benefit contract, as this is the most 
common form of LTC insurance contract in Europe (Kessler, 2010). Let I be the insurance 
premium where   is the premium per unity of coverage. If p , the premium is actuarial, 
if p , the premium is loaded.  
The expected utility of the parent is given by: 
 
𝑉 = 𝑝𝑢(𝑤0 − 𝑁(𝑒) + 𝐼(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑠(𝑤0, 𝛼), 𝑒) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(𝑤0 − 𝜃𝐼) 
 
The optimal level of insurance is given by the first-order condition (FOC): 
 
𝑉𝐼 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝑢
′(. ) − 𝜃(1 − 𝑝)𝑣′(. ) = 0   (1) 
 
The second order condition for a maximum is verified under risk aversion, i.e. 𝑢′′(. ) < 0 
and 𝑣′′(. ) < 0. 
From eq. (1), in the case of an actuarial premium ( p ), it is easy to show that the 
optimal level of insurance 𝐼∗ is such that 𝐼∗ = 𝑁(𝑒) − 𝑠(𝑤0, 𝛼)) if 𝑢
′(. ) = 𝑣′(. ), which 
corresponds to full insurance, i.e. such as the indemnity covers the full financial loss (the 
                                               
5
 This relation finds strong support empirically (see e.g. Bolin et al., 2007; Bonsang, 2009). 
6
 When no subscript is indicated for the derivative, it means that we differentiate with respect to wealth. 
 
     
 
 8 
cost of formal care minus the public subsidy). If 𝑢′(. ) < 𝑣′(. ), then 𝐼∗ < 𝑁(𝑒) − 𝑠(𝑤0, 𝛼)), 
which corresponds to partial insurance. This latter case is the more realistic, as utility 
marginal of wealth in case of dependency is usually lower than utility marginal of wealth in 
case of good health as empirically showed (see Evans and Viscusi (1991) and Finkelstein et 
al. (2009)). 
So as to investigate both state and family crowding out of LTC insurance, we wonder 
how the optimal level of LTC insurance reacts to an increase in the expected level of state 
support and of informal care, i.e. we develop some comparative static analysis. The second 
order condition being satisfied, the direction of the effect of marginal variation of exogenous 
parameters is given by the sign of the derivative of the FOC with respect to the exogenous 
parameter. 
Differentiating the FOC with respect to e, we obtain that 
 
𝑉𝐼𝑒 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)(−𝑁
′(𝑒))𝑢′′ + 𝑢𝑤𝑒
′′ ) < 0 since 𝑢′′ < 0 and 𝑢𝑤𝑒
′′ < 0.  
 
Hence, the more the individual is expected to receive informal care, the lower he 
purchases LTC insurance. This means that informal care crowds out insurance under both 
risk aversion and parental altruism. However, even if we do not consider parental altruism, 
informal care would still crowd out LTC insurance as far the individual is risk averse. 
Now, differentiating the FOC with respect to 𝛼 makes is possible to investigate how an 
increase in public support (𝑠𝛼
′ > 0) impacts LTC insurance. This gives:  
 
𝑉𝐼𝛼 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)(𝑠𝛼
′ )𝑢′′ < 0 since 𝑢′′ < 0. 
 
Hence, the higher the public support, the lower insurance purchase, meaning that under 
risk aversion public support crowds out LTC insurance. 
Results can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 1: When informal care is exogenous, both expected state support and informal 
care crowds out LTC insurance. 
 
Naturally, we can also investigate how other exogenous shocks impact the optimal level 
of insurance such as shocks on the probability of being dependent and the level of initial 
wealth.  







𝑉𝐼𝑝 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑢
′(. ) + 𝜃𝑣′(. ) > 0   
𝑉𝐼𝑤0 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)(1 + 𝑠𝑤0
′ )𝑢′′ − 𝜃(1 − 𝑝)𝑣′′ > 0 if 𝑠𝑤0
′ < −1 
 
Hence, those more at risk purchase more insurance. Also, a higher initial wealth increases 
the demand for insurance for risk averse individuals if means testing of LTC is stringent 
(𝑠𝑤0
′ < −1), otherwise we cannot conclude. 
 
3.2 Endogeneity of informal care and intrafamily moral hazard 
 
So far we have assumed that the level of informal care is exogenous with respect to insurance. 
However, as indicated before, the level of informal care provided by informal care givers may 
depend on the level of insurance purchased by the dependent elderly. This is what Pauly (1990) 
labeled intra-family moral hazard which refers to the disincentives for children or relatives as 
informal givers to provide care when the parent has LTC insurance. The explanation is that a 
bequest can serve as a way for an elderly parent to compensate the child for the opportunity cost 
of providing care. In this situation, LTC insurance has the effect of protecting the bequest from 
the cost of LTC, weakening the child’s incentive to provide care (Zweifel and Strüwe, 1996). We 
then suppose now that the parent takes into account the intra-family moral hazard phenomena on 
the child’s side, i.e. he takes into account the fact that the higher the insurance coverage, the 
lower the informal care supplied by his child. In order to integrate the possibility of intra-family 
moral hazard in our model, we simply make the expected level of informal care depend 
negatively on insurance, i.e. we assume that e depends negatively on I.  
The expected utility of the parent becomes: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑝𝑢(𝑤0 − 𝑁(𝑒(𝐼)) + 𝐼(1 − 𝜃) + 𝑠(𝑤0, 𝛼), 𝑒(𝐼)) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(𝑤0 − 𝑝𝐼) 
 
The optimal level of insurance is now given by: 
 
𝑈𝐼 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)𝑢
′(. ) − 𝜃(1 − 𝑝)𝑣′(. ) − 𝑝𝑒𝐼
′𝑁𝑒
′𝑢′(. ) + 𝑝𝑒𝐼
′𝑢𝑒
′ (. ) = 0                                (2) 
 
We can then compare the optimal levels of insurance with and without intra-family moral 
hazard by evaluating eq. (2) in I
*







′𝑢′(. ) − 𝑢𝑒
′ (. ))                                                                                          (3) 
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 Assuming 𝑒(𝐼∗) = 𝑒. 
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The sign of this equation depends both on the marginal utility of wealth and on the 
marginal utility with respect to the informal caregiver’s quality of life. When the parent is 
not sensitive about the informal caregiver quality of life (𝑢𝑒
′ (. ) = 0), then eq. (3) is always 
negative and the introduction of intra-family moral hazard always decreases the demand for 
LTC insurance as usually referred in the literature (e.g. Courbage and Zweifel, 2011). 
However, if we consider that the parent can be sensitive to the informal caregiver’s well-
being, i.e. he is altruistic, the presence of intra-family moral hazard can lead to either an 
increase or a decrease in LTC insurance. There is an increase (decrease) in insurance if and 
only if the loss of utility from spending more on formal care is inferior (superior) to the gain 
of utility due to a better informal caregiver quality of life following less informal care, i.e. if 
and only if 𝑁𝑒
′𝑢′(. ) < (>)𝑢𝑒
′ (. ). Thus, the usual negative influence intra-family moral 
hazard could have on LTC insurance can be compensated by the positive influence on LTC 
insurance of the parent being concerned by their relatives’ quality of life. This means that 
the availability of informal care does not necessarily reduce the level of insurance. It 
depends on whether there is presence of intra-family moral and parental altruism, and how 
one phenomenon dominates the other. 
Let us now investigate if the presence of intra-family moral hazard modifies the state 
crowding-out effect. Differentiating the FOC with respect to 𝛼 gives 
 
𝑈𝐼𝛼 = 𝑝(1 − 𝜃)(𝑠𝛼
′ )𝑢′′ − 𝑝𝑠𝛼
′ 𝑒𝐼
′𝑁𝑒
′𝑢′′(. ) + 𝑝𝑠𝛼
′ 𝑒𝐼
′𝑒𝑢𝑤𝑒
′′ (. ) 
 
The first term is negative as in the case of no intra-family hazard since higher public 
support increases wealth in the case of dependency and therefore reduces the benefit of 
insurance. The second term is positive, as higher public support reduces the loss of wealth 
due to spending more on formal care. The third term is also positive, as higher public 
support increases the gain of utility due to a better quality of life of the informal giver in 
providing less informal care. Hence when informal care is endogenous to insurance and 
there exists parental altruism, a higher level of expected state support can actually increase 
the demand for LTC insurance (even if the parent is not considered as altruistic). 
Results can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 2: When informal care is endogenous to insurance, as happens if the parent 
integrates intra-family moral hazard in his decision, then more public support or the 







We could also look at how the optimal demand for insurance reacts to the same 
exogenous shocks as the ones addressed before. It is obvious that results differ from the ones 
obtained in the preceding section.  
In conclusion, this theoretical model has shown that when informal care is exogenous, 
both state support and informal care crowds out LTC insurance. However, when informal 
care is endogenous to insurance, as happens if the parent integrates intrafamily moral hazard 
in his decision, then more public support or the availability of informal care could increase 
the demand for LTC insurance. 
 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
The core prediction of the crowding-out hypothesis states that expectations of both public 





We draw from individual data on individual expectations to capture ‘ex-ante preferences’ 
which are especially relevant in the context of a weak market. Alternatively, one can rely on 
revealed preferences when choices of people who have been exposed to different forms of 
insurance are observed. To our knowledge, data for such option is imperfect. Longitudinal 
studies generally fail to report insurance expectations data, and market data on insurance 
choices when there is a market is largely affected by underwriting, and hence only 
imperfectly proxies reveal choices. In addition, existing longitudinal evidence in Europe is 
unsuited to examine the effects of a hypothetical double crowding-out by public insurance 
and family
8
. In contrast, Eurobarometer data (Special Eurobarometer 283) contains a 
number of records on a rich cross section of European countries, reporting on LTC payment 
expectations and including private insurance, social insurance, public support, family 
contributions, and self-insurance. This makes Eurobarometer the best currently available 
dataset for testing the motivational crowding-out hypothesis. That said, it is important to 
point out two important limitations, namely the fact that data only consider an ex-ante 
dimension and does not report information on individuals in institutional care. Second, the 
sample is only a cross section which makes causal analysis challenging.  
                                               
8
 The SHARE survey imperfectly defines LTC insurance and does not contain expectations data.  
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The special Eurobarometer 283 is a cross-sectional representative sample of European 
countries that specifically examine question on health and LTC. It includes extensive 
information on family characteristics, as well as information on expectations and attitudes 
towards LTC by individuals of different age cohorts and genders. The data was collected 
between the 25th of May and the 30th of June 2007, TNS Opinion & Social interviewed 
28,660 Europeans aged 15 and over living in the 27 European Union Member States and the 
two candidate countries. From such a subsample we selected a subsample of 15,172 
comprising respondents of European Union Member States prior to 1st May 2004 where the 
meaning and extension of LTC is precisely identified. The sample is made of stratified 
sampling representative of the European "administrative regional units” or EUROSTAT 




Dependent Variables. Our dependent variable refers to expectations of private insurance 
funding. More specifically, we measure expectations as the response to the following 
question: "If you were to need regular help and long-term care that would require payment, 
who do you think will finance this?”9. Individuals can choose among a set of options 
including payment by themselves (self-insurance), payment by their private insurance, 
payment by social insurance and finally, another option included was payment by family 
members besides the spouse.  
 
Explanatory Variables. The candidate variables to explain our claim of a potential double 
crowding out include on the one hand expectations of family funding (family insurance)
10
 
and on the other hand expectations of social insurance funding. Both variables are expected 
to pick up motivations of both family and public insurance. One potential theoretical and 
empirical concern that we address in the empirical strategy is that there might exist a 
phenomenon of endogeneity of family support in the sense that such support might depend 
on insurance choices. The dataset contains two questions on expectations of family support 
(family insurance) and expectations of family support alongside self-insurance. As an 
instrument for family insurance, we employ data on residential distance of children to parent 
                                               
9
 The latter is question QA21 of the survey. The same question provides evidence that allows identifying 
individual responses on the basis of expectations of family support, expectation of self-insurance as well as 
expectations of private insurance.  
10






as well as general attitudes towards the importance of family ties
11
. In contrast, public 
insurance expectations, given its collective nature rather than purely an individual choice, 
were not treated as theoretically endogenous. Furthermore, instruments at hand measuring 
political self-positioning could not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Another 
potential feature to address is that the answer to the expectation question as framed might 
not be independent of the person’s own expected situation12, especially questions that are 
hypothetical. To controls for some of these effects we include a list of controls for risk 
related behavior as well as demographic and socio-economic effects. These later are in turn 
justified in light of the state dependent utility framework employed in the theoretical section. 
Finally, there is a potential simultaneity issue as people are being asked about their 
expectations in a multiple response question. However, given that each question was asked 
separately, we treat such responses separately.   
 
Individual control variables. The choice of the controls was based on both theory and 
preliminary descriptive analysis. We attempted to avoid over specifying the model
13
. We 
include a list of important controls including risk perceptions of needing LTC later in life, 
life expectancy expectations (or perceived length of life), as well as personal risks that can 
proxy the individual probability of being dependent which are reported in Table 1. Other 
controls include the respondent’s age, and migration status, income and education. All of 
these variables can potentially play a role in determining expectation of insurance for LTC. 
Finally, we include state level fixed effects, given that there is some potential heterogeneity 
that runs from the specific institutions of each European member state. That is, ppeople’s 
preferences with regard to insurance, informal care and state support are likely to be affected 
by factors such as: supply, culture, and people’s values concerning redistribution/equity and 
so on. The latter explains that country-specific estimates might provide an incomplete 
picture of the interaction effects as some important institutional heterogeneity is lost in 
looking at country effects. That said, there is still a potential for omitted variable bias that 
we must acknowledge.  
                                               
11
 The overidentification test provided a p=0.12 suggesting that the restriction is satisfied and the F-test  of 26.2 
suggested that instrument has acceptable strength. The theoretical validity lies in the assumption that residential 
distance influences caregiving expectation through family ties.  
12
 More specifically in measuring expectation of family support the question is hypothetical and hence one could 
argue that expectation could be instead represented by the E(Family) = E(V(F;σ))+ϵ, where V is a normative value 
function and σ individual specific bias. 
13
 For instance, we observed that the number of children was not significantly different between individuals 
revealing insurance expectation and those without, and did not proxy family expectations. 
 






4.3 Empirical Strategy 
 
This section is devoted to an empirical test of the crowding out hypothesis by relating 
LTC insurance to public entitlement and family insurance.  Given the absence of a market as 
such, we cannot follow the empirical methodology of Cutler (2002), who addressed the 
crowding out of private insurance by examining the impact of Medicaid as last resort 
insurance in the United States. Unlike in the United States, most European countries exhibit 
some level of public support, and even offer some entitlement as discussed in the 
background section, yet coverage is partial. Low insurance uptake might be caused by 
consumer uncertainty examining a possible crowding out of insurance by family social 
norms (also refereed as family bailout). Note that current patterns of behavior, notably in 
southern Europe, may have little predictive value and in contrast information about future 
expectations may even have more merit than data reflecting actual decisions.  
Given the heterogeneity in the development of the LTC insurance industry in Europe, our 
analysis relies on EU-15 which allows us to identify at least two extreme cohorts of 
countries, namely northern and southern European respectively that exhibit different patterns 
of behaviour. We exploit cohort effects given its importance on how they deal with old-age 
needs. Old-age dependency is generally a contingency emerging later in life, and hence 
individuals might arguably fail to plan ahead for it before a certain age cut-off point. 
Therefore, the interpretation of 'optimal behavioural responses' to the need of caregiving in 
old-age is cohort-specific. Similarly, females are more likely to be caregivers and to survive 
their spouses, and hence expectations of needing LTC options arguably can be regarded as 
gender-specific. However, the latter are empirical questions, and hence answers are driven 
by the data.  
To provide some empirical support of the theoretical model, we first estimate insurance 
expectations with informal care expectations both being exogenously determined (no 
presence of intra-family moral hazard) and later endogenously determined (by instrumenting 
family care expectations). We proceed then to estimate the case where insurance decisions 
are made assuming informal care being codetermined (potential presence of intra-family 
moral hazard). In the model, we investigate whether we have different results of the effect of 
state support along with a set of above-mentioned controls.  The choice of the empirical 






are sensitive to endogeneity) and to address potential problems of confounding factors and 
reverse causality.  
We draw upon linear probability specification
14
 assuming no endogeneity and 
independent determination of insurance and informal care decisions. Estimates reported 
include the following:  
 
𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖=𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦)𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 
+𝛽4𝑋𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                    (3)                                              
 
where E(.) refers to an individually formed expectation. All regressions report standard 
errors clustered to the regional level to account for the potential correlation between 
individuals of the same region, and we report the marginal effects. We then run instrumental 
variable (IV) models using residential distance to family members and self-reported family 
ties as an instrument to predict informal care expectations 𝐸𝑖(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦̂ ) as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖=𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑖(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦̂ ) + 𝛼2𝐸(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖 
+𝛼4𝑋𝑖 +  𝜃𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                   (4)                                                                 
 
where 𝛽, 𝛼 are regression parameters, 𝜇, 𝜃 are fixed effects and 𝜀, 𝜖 refer to a random error. 
Following the specification, we tested for over-identification and weak instruments. Finally, 
given the potential cohort effects, we have produced cohort specific estimates. However, 
given the sample size large, and to avoid the sensitivity of IV estimates to sample size, we 




This section reports the results of regressions estimates with and without considering 
potential identification problems due to endogeneous covariates and with clustered 
country-specific standard errors.  
 
5.1 Preliminary Evidence 
 
                                               
14
 We estimated probit models and results did not reveal sensitivity to the specification. Hence, we report the linear 
probability model for simplicity.  
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European data is particularly suitable because of the large variability in both public and 
family insurance arrangements. Figure 1 contains suggestive evidence of the dramatic 
polarisation of preferences for LTC. 49% of Greeks, 43% of Portuguese and 39% of 
Spaniards think the best option for an old-age dependent elderly should be taken care of by 
their own family members. Similarly, 40% of Greeks and 30% of Austrian think that 
children should be visiting their parents regularly to provide for care. In contrast, 58 % of 
Swedish, 59% of Danes and 52% of Finns and Dutch regard as their best option that public 
or private service providers should visit them at home and provide them with appropriate 
help and care. Finally, 22% of Swedish and 20% of Belgians and Dutch think that old-age 
dependents should be moved to a nursing home. Finally, the majority of Europeans expect 
paying into an insurance scheme that will finance care if and when care is needed should 
be obligatory (70%). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviation of the variable included in our analysis by 
expectation on LTC funding. Relative to those not expecting insurance coverage to pay for care, 
we find that those who expect to receive insurance coverage are older, tend to be females, have a 
lower level of education but not less income, live closer to their families and are more likely to 
be already dependent and overweight. However we found no significant differences in terms of 
the expected life span and risk perceptions, as well as experience with care, or the probability of 
being a smoker. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 contains evidence of the main explanatory variables, namely expectation of private 
insurance payment, public insurance payment and family support expectations by country. 
Importantly, evidence suggests that countries with lower expected insurance uptake (southern 
European countries) are those with highest family insurance and lowest public insurance 
payment expectations. The opposite is true for the Netherlands but not for other countries (like 
the United Kingdom). In contrast, Scandinavian countries exhibit high expectations of public 
insurance uptake and lower expectations of family support. Hence, based on preliminary 
evidence one can argue that there is some evidence of both public and family insurance 
motivation crowding out. However, it is unclear whether such patterns are robust to the inclusion 







[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
 
Table 3 reports evidence of a linear probability model on the effect of expectations of family 
insurance, public insurance expectation alongside a long list of controls. We estimate the models 
with both options of crowding out and only one, as well as only the basic list of controls. 
Evidence suggests only evidence consistent with family insurance crowding out. Regarding 
controls, we find that insurance expectations are more prevalent among younger to middle-age 
respondents, given that after a certain age, both the probability of obtaining insurance declines 
and other arrangements are generally formed. Women and educated respondents are more likely 
to be expecting insurance coverage. As expected, life expectancy expectations and income are 
associated with insurance expectations both proxying higher need and ability to pay respectively. 
The latter are suggestive that those expecting to use LTC and to be able to afford LTC insurance 
premiums are more likely to expect insurance coverage. This is also in accordance with the 
theoretical comparative statics showing that those with a higher probability of being dependent 
purchase more insurance as well as those with higher wealth (see section 3.1). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 reports the same results, but assuming expectations of family to be instrumented by 
‘(geographical) distance to children’ and ‘perceptions of family ties’. In both sets of regressions, 
we find evidence of a strong family crowding-out effect, whereby people who expect the family 
are less likely to expect insurance to pay for LTC. However, for the latter we were not able to 
find for public insurance. After instrumenting family support expectations, the effect on expected 




[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 in the first panel reports a battery of robustness checks using different measures of 
family care support as described above, yet in this case, the Wu-Hausman F test could not reject 
the hypothesis of exogeneity. Consistently, results reveal a negative effect of informal care but 
not effect of public sector crowding out. In the second panel of Table 5 we report cohort effect 
using the two alternative definitions of family support expectations. Estimates suggest 
                                               
15
 We reject the hypothesis of exogeneity based on the Wu-Hausman F test of 3.81616 F(1,11676). 
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comparable estimates when examining subsample of cohorts of age. More specifically, we find 
family insurance crowding-out that doubles in magnitude for the age group 26 to 40, which is the 
group before people are argued to start thinking on funding LTC, and precisely around the age of 
40 is regarded as the optimal age to purchase LTC insurance (Meier, 1999). The coefficients 
were also significantly higher for the cohort of 40 to 55. These are subgroups that are generally 
less likely to have already made arrangement for their dependency needs at old-age. Importantly, 
for the age group 55 and over, we find evidence consistent with a double crowding out. Our 
interpretation is that at an advanced age, individuals that have not made arrangement for private 
insurance might only have access to public insurance to bail them out. 
 





We have addressed the question of potential motivation crowding out effects of family and 
public insurance on private LTC insurance by developing a theoretical model and by drawing on 
a sample of individual expectation of respondents in a sample of European countries restricted to 
fifteen countries and examining cohort specific effects.  
Specifically, we have attempted to provide some evidence for the reasons for the limited 
development of a market for LTC insurance, namely the existence and nature of motivational 
interactions between society’s responses to the need of such care, and government financing both 
ex-ante and ex-post. The theoretical model predicts that, when informal care is treated as 
exogenously determined, expectations of both state support and informal care crowd out LTC 
insurance expectations, while this is not necessarily the case when informal care is endogenous 
to insurance, as happens when intra-family moral hazard is integrated in the insurance decision. 
Our results on expectations data indicate firstly, that individuals who expect to be financially 
supported out by their family are less likely to purchase insurance whether informal care is 
considered as exogenous or endogenous. In light of the theoretical model’s predictions, these 
results imply that the decision to purchase LTC insurance is not consistent with the presence of 
intra-family moral hazard. Our empirical results indicate secondly, that those individuals who 
expect public insurance to pay for LTC are not less likely to purchase insurance. The latter is 
consistent with the fact that public insurance still encompass significant cost sharing and hence, 






Needless to say, our results need to be treated with some caution given that they rely on data 
referring to people’s expected/hypothetical behavior, which may differ from their actual 
behavior. One would expect issues related to the framing and wording of expectations data, and 
more generally to the conditional nature of these decisions. To address some of these 
weaknesses, we have ran the regression including a list of controls which contain data on 
respondents cooperation, experience with LTC insurance both of which could affect the framing 
of the question, and results were not significantly different in any of the regression presented 
above
16
.  However, it appears important to treat our results with some caution. 
Our results contain a few lessons for public policy. While a crowding out of private LTC 
insurance by its public counterpart does not appear to be a major problem at present (at least in 
European countries) longer-term crowding out of social norms may well occur (see for instance 
Costa-Font (2010) for some evidence even when family insurance is regarded as endogenous). 
This calls for reforms addressing LTC financing through for instance cost-sharing schemes and 
eligibility criteria that are transparent and stable over time. Private insurers have experience with 
cost sharing; they might take on complementary role ‘topping up’ basic entitlements as it is 
found to be the case in France or Germany. However, such complementary public private 
partnerships should not undermine incentives to provide informal care within the family, the 
sense that should be neutral on family decisions.  
  
                                               
16
 Results are available upon request.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 




Source: Special EUROBAROMETER 283, question  
Question: Imagine an elderly father or mother who lives alone and can no longer manage to live without regular 
help because of her or his physical or mental health condition? In your opinion, what would be the best option for 










% they should move to a nursing home
% Public or private service providers should visit their home and provide them with
appropriate help and care
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Source: Special EUROBAROMETER 283 
Note: Column 1 contains the mean value of the sample of individuals that expect long-term care insurance (LTCI) to 
pay for their care. Similarly, Column 2 contains the means value of the sample of those who do not expect LTCI to 
pay for care. The table reports the means and standard deviations of variables employed in the study.  We report 
means and standard error for continuous variables, and only the mean for binary variables.  
  
 




Table 2. Expectations of Long Term Care Funding –  











































































































































Source: Special EUROBAROMETER 283 
Question: QA21 If you were to need regular help and long-term care that would require payment, who do you think 
will finance this? 








Table 3. Crowding-Out of Private Insurance Expectations (Linear Probability Model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family Insurance -0.0714*** -0.0719*** -0.0726*** -0.0695*** 
 (0.00916) (0.00909) (0.00755) (0.00760) 
Public Insurance 0.00327   0.0204*** 
 (0.00742)   (0.00630) 
Age 0.00751*** 0.00755*** 0.00717*** 0.00691*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00111) (0.000909) (0.000912) 
Age
2 
-7.25e-05*** -7.27e-05*** -6.10e-05*** -5.88e-05*** 
 (1.13e-05) (1.13e-05) (8.96e-06) (8.98e-06) 
Gender 0.0384*** 0.0386*** 0.0373*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.00735) (0.00734) (0.00621) (0.00622) 
Education 0.00122*** 0.00122*** 0.000779*** 0.000777*** 
 (0.000275) (0.000275) (0.000209) (0.000209) 
Divorced -0.000411 -2.47e-05   
 (0.0141) (0.0141)   
Lifeexp 0.000873*** 0.000875***   
 (0.000267) (0.000267)   
Dependency -0.00790*** -0.00786***   
 (0.00271) (0.00271)   
Riskp 0.000671 0.000735   
 (0.00730) (0.00730)   
Natural -0.0303** -0.0304**   
 (0.0145) (0.0145)   
Smoking -0.00886 -0.00874   
 (0.00832) (0.00832)   
Income (logs) 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.379*** 0.377*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0314) (0.0314) 
Constant 4.210*** 4.215*** 4.762*** 4.735*** 
 (0.461) (0.461) (0.386) (0.386) 
Observations 11,691 11,691 15,172 15,172 
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 4. Crowding-Out of Private Insurance (IV Estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES privains privains privains privains 
Family Insurance -0.340** -0.302** -0.337*** -0.357*** 
 (0.143) (0.129) (0.105) (0.118) 
Public Insurance -0.0236   -0.00909 
 (0.0162)   (0.0137) 
Age 0.0072*** 0.0070*** 0.0061*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00103) (0.000998) 
Age
2
 -7.81e-05*** -7.57e-05*** -6.09e-05*** -6.19e-05*** 
 (1.21e-05) (1.17e-05) (9.32e-06) (9.48e-06) 
Gender 0.0383*** 0.0372*** 0.0342*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.00761) (0.00758) (0.00657) (0.00655) 
Education 0.000871** 0.000904*** 0.000491** 0.000471* 
 (0.000339) (0.000332) (0.000245) (0.000251) 
Divorced -0.0111 -0.0121   
 (0.0157) (0.0160)   
Lifeexp 0.000703** 0.000710**   
 (0.000291) (0.000289)   
Dependency -0.00889*** -0.00899***   
 (0.00285) (0.00285)   
Riskp 0.00452 0.00363   
 (0.00784) (0.00767)   
Natural -0.0564*** -0.0527***   
 (0.0204) (0.0194)   
Smoking 0.000337 -0.00156   
 (0.00991) (0.00943)   
Income (logs) 0.250*** 0.258*** 0.291*** 0.286*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0581) (0.0477) (0.0496) 
Constant 3.260*** 3.348*** 3.770*** 3.710*** 
 (0.694) (0.676) (0.563) (0.581) 
Observations 11,691 11,691 15,172 15,172 
Standard errors in parentheses 














Table 5. Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) 
Panel (I): Alternative definition of family Insurance 
 
Family Insurance -0.0637*** -0.0646*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0107) 
Public Insurance 0.00455  
 (0.00744)  
Panel (II): Cohort specific groups effects 
 
 Definition A Definition B 
Age – Under 25    
Family Insurance -0.059*** -0.0476** 
 (0.0223) (0.0215) 
Public Insurance 0.0508** 0.0519** 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Age – 26-40   
Family Insurance -0.105*** -0.093*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0216) 
Public Insurance 0.0458*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) 
Age – 41-65   
Family Insurance -0.067*** -0.065*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0223) 
Public Insurance 0.00817 0.00881 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) 
Age Over 65   
Family Insurance -0.049*** -0.0446*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0149) 
Public Insurance -0.0396*** -0.0392*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include, age, age squared, gender, education, life expectancy 
expectations, old age dependency, risk perceptions, immigrant status, smoking and income (in logs) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
